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Abstract
Background: In the growing body of literature on economic decision making, the main focus has
typically been on explaining aggregate behavior, with little interest in individual differences despite
considerable between-subject variability in decision responses. In this study, we were interested in
asking to what degree individual differences in fundamental psychological processes can mediate
economic decision-making behavior.
Methods: Specifically, we studied a personality dimension that may influence economic decision-
making, the Behavioral Activation System, (BAS) which is composed of three components: Reward
Responsiveness, Drive, and Fun Seeking. In order to assess economic decision making, we utilized
two commonly-used tasks, the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game. Individual differences in BAS
were measured by completion of the BIS/BAS Scales, and correlations between the BAS scales and
monetary offers made in the two tasks were computed.
Results: We found that higher scores on BAS Drive and on BAS Reward Responsiveness were
associated with a pattern of higher offers on the Ultimatum Game, lower offers on the Dictator
Game, and a correspondingly larger discrepancy between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game
offers.
Conclusion: These findings are consistent with an interpretation that high scores on Drive and
Reward Responsiveness are associated with a strategy that first seeks to maximize the likelihood of
reward, and then to maximize the amount of reward. More generally, these results suggest that
there are additional factors other than empathy, fairness and selfishness that contribute to strategic
decision-making.
Background
For many centuries theoreticians have attempted to build
accurate models of how people make judgments, deci-
sions, and choices. To endeavor to answer these important
questions about decision-making behavior, researchers
from a wide variety of fields have used many different
approaches and methods, though for many years this area
of interest has been the purview of economists and math-
ematicians. The resulting mathematical models, such as
the family of Expected Utility models [1], were initially
proposed as primarily prescriptive, that is, modeling how
decisions should be made. However, these models were
also taken as good approximations of how people actually
make judgments and decisions.
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These models remained largely unchallenged as descrip-
tive accounts of behavior until quite recently, when psy-
chological studies of these processes revealed that the
models did not in fact capture many of the complexities
observed in human decision-making. Careful experiments
demonstrated multiple deviations from the "rational"
approach of the standard Utility model [2], and new mod-
els were proposed that attempted to explain many of these
observed decision behaviors. For example, the Prospect
theory model of judgment [3] introduces additional
parameters to the utility model to account for choices
under risk. Further, modern neuroscience techniques have
now allowed more biologically plausible models of deci-
sion, building upon the proposals from psychology with
an increased understanding of the underlying neural sub-
strate [4].
While these psychological and neuroscience models have
been unquestionably useful in the study of decision-mak-
ing, several aspects of this process have thus far been
rather understudied. One important question is the
degree to which individual differences in fundamental
psychological processes can mediate decision-making
behavior, in particular economic decision-making.
Models of economic behavior to date, such as the domi-
nant family of Expected Utility models, have typically
focused on explaining aggregate behavior (such as that of
a market), with little interest paid to individual differ-
ences, despite the often considerable variability in deci-
sion responses in these situations [2]. Therefore, as a first
step it would be useful to examine the degree to which
individual differences in certain processes can explain dif-
ferences in decision-making.
Additionally, these economic models, as noted above,
generally have not attempted to understand decision-
making in the context of psychological processes, instead
concentrating on the decision-maker as a "utility maxi-
mizer" with utility typically defined in terms of monetary
payoffs. A further goal of this study then, is to demon-
strate how differences in psychological processes can help
understand decision-making behavior when it deviates
from the utility maximization approach.
Experimental studies of economic decision-making have
used a wide variety of tasks, often termed "games", in
studying this behavior [5]. These tasks, relatively underu-
tilized in psychology and neuroscience, have the advan-
tages that they are typically very simple to understand and
implement, have been well-studied, and often produce
quite interesting patterns of results. Two games in particu-
lar that fulfill these criteria are the Ultimatum Game [6]
and the Dictator Game [7]. Both of these games involve
the splitting of a sum of money between two players – a
Proposer and a Responder – and by using these games in
concert, interesting patterns of economic and social deci-
sion-making emerge.
In the Ultimatum Game the Proposer is given a sum of
money, for example $5, and asked to divide this between
themselves and the other player – the Responder. After
receiving the Proposer's offer, which can be any division
of this amount, the Responder must then either accept or
reject the offer. If the Responder accepts, the money is
split as proposed. If the Responder rejects, neither player
receives any money. Both players are fully aware of the
rules of the game and once the decision is made, the game
is over.
Game theoretic models prescribe that the optimal solu-
tion is for the Proposer to offer as little as possible (say 10
cents), and for the Responder to accept this small amount
on the grounds that something is better than nothing [8].
However, in contrast to the prescriptive models, Proposers
most commonly offer an even split (i.e. $2.50 to each
player in our $5 pot example), and Responders often
reject proposals of less than 20% of the total amount (for
a summary of recent research see [5]), thus indicating a
desire to value equity over monetary reward in some cir-
cumstances. The Dictator Game is similar to the Ultima-
tum Game, except that in this case the Responder cannot
reject a proposal and must accept whatever the Proposer
gives them. Again, in the Dictator Game both players have
full knowledge of the rules and the proposals.
Why do Proposers offer generally fair (i.e. equal split)
offers in the Ultimatum Game? There have been two pos-
sible explanations suggested. One, people may offer more
than a minimal amount to the other player because they
care about equity and treating the other player fairly [9].
Two, Proposers may anticipate that Responders will reject
too low an offer [10]. So, offering more than a minimal
amount may be a strategic decision to increase the likeli-
hood of ending up with at least some amount of money.
The Dictator Game has been used in addition to the Ulti-
matum Game to help tease apart these two potential
explanations for higher than minimal offers [11]. Dictator
Game offers are made with the certainty that they will be
accepted, so giving a 'pure' measure of the degree to which
the Proposer cares about equity and fairness, as all strate-
gic considerations should have been removed in this
game. Therefore, by examining the pattern of offers made
by people in both Ultimatum and Dictator Games, we can
make inferences about the motives behind the decisions
made by Proposers, and begin to understand to what
degree they are influenced by considerations of fairness or
by self-interest. Equal splits in both games suggest that the
Proposer is motivated by fairness. However, if a ProposerBehavioral and Brain Functions 2006, 2:35 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/2/1/35
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offers an even split in the Ultimatum Game but an unfair
offer in the Dictator Game, we can infer strategic motives.
As mentioned above, though these tasks have been widely
used in the field of behavioral economics, there have been
very few attempts to understand the psychological factors
that may underlie decisions made in these situations.
Some experimental factors have been studied to date, such
as culture [12,13], methodological manipulations [e.g.,
[14]], description of the games [15], structural changes to
the games [e.g., [15-18]], and demographic variables such
as gender [19-22], race [20], and age [[23,24]; see 5 for
review]. However, we could find only two studies that
have explored the role of individual differences in psycho-
logical processes in decision making in the Ultimatum
Game: one study on selfishness [25], and another on
emotions [26]. The goal of this study was therefore to
examine whether individual differences in certain person-
ality features are associated with offers made in Ultima-
tum and Dictator Games, and to what degree these
differences influence the various motives underlying the
decisions in these contexts.
A personality dimension of obvious relevance to eco-
nomic decision-making is attitude towards reward. While
all modern decision-making models include potential
rewards as a key aspect of the utility calculation (e.g. [3]),
there is surprisingly little research on how individual sen-
sitivity towards reward may motivate decisions and
choices. One of the primary components of the Ultima-
tum and Dictator Game tasks is the receipt of monetary
reward, and therefore we might expect that differential
levels of reward sensitivity will be associated with differ-
ent types of offers in these games.
A psychological measure that has often been used to
assess individual differences in reward sensitivity is the
Behavioral Activation System (BAS) scale [27]. This meas-
ure is generally used in concert with the Behavioral Inhi-
bition System (BIS) scale, which has been designed to
measure aversive motivation. As we were interested in the
relationship between reward sensitivity and decision-
making, we focused solely on the BAS scale and how it
might help understand decision-making in the context of
these economic games. The BAS scale consists of three
sub-scales: (1) the Reward Responsiveness scale measur-
ing positive responses to the occurrence or anticipation of
reward; (2) the Drive scale measuring the persistent pur-
suit of desired goals; and (3) the Fun Seeking scale meas-
uring a willingness to approach a new event on the spur of
the moment.
The BAS itself has been defined as a physiological mecha-
nism that underlies appetitive motivation and approach
behavior [27-31], and that is sensitive to signals of reward.
Dopamine is thought to play an important role in this
[32]. Indeed, more recent research has provided evidence
for the idea that dopamine plays a crucial role in reward
processing [29]. Activity in the BAS is thought to be
related to goal-directed behavior and positive feelings
when exposed to cues signaling impending rewards
[28,29].
Based on this, a simple first-order hypothesis is that
higher levels of BAS will be associated with lower offers in
both the Ultimatum and Dictator games, reflecting the
greater desire for monetary rewards in both games in
those with greater sensitivity to rewards. Specifically, we
hypothesize that a negative relationship will be observed
between offers in these tasks and two of the sub-scales
(Reward Responsiveness and Drive), but not in the Fun
Seeking scale, because the latter scale assesses more sensa-
tion-seeking behavior than reward sensitivity (see [27]).
It is also possible that BAS may have more complex effects
on decisions made in the two games, although we do not
have specific predictions in this regard. For example, dif-
ferential effects of BAS on offers made in the two games
would reflect a greater influence of reward sensitivity on
either strategic or equitable motives in these tasks.
Individual differences in goal-oriented behavior and
responsiveness to the anticipation of rewarding outcomes
(as measured by the BAS Reward Responsiveness and
Drive scales) are potentially key factors behind offers
made in the two tasks of interest. Therefore, finding a rela-
tionship between these scales and proposal amounts
would help in understanding the psychological motiva-
tions behind economic decisions. This study therefore
examined performance in the Ultimatum and Dictator
Games, and investigated the contribution of the reward
system to decision-making in these tasks.
Methods
Participants
Subjects were 69 undergraduate students at the University
of Arizona. Two participants were excluded from data
analyses (see below). Therefore, we describe here data
from 67 participants. This sample consisted of 31 males
and 36 females. The age range of participants was 18–29,
with a mean age of was 19.7 (SD = 2.3), and all signed
informed consent forms before participation.
BIS/BAS Rating Scale
All participants completed the BIS/BAS scales [27]. The
BAS Reward Responsiveness scale has 5 items pertaining
to positive responses to the anticipation or occurrence of
reward. The BAS Drive scale includes 4 items that focus on
the pursuit of desired goals. The BAS Fun Seeking scale has
4 items focusing on a desire for new rewards and a willing-Behavioral and Brain Functions 2006, 2:35 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/2/1/35
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ness to approach a potentially rewarding event on the
spur of the moment. Responses were made on a 4-point
scale, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and 4 indicat-
ing strong agreement. The internal reliabilities of the BAS
scales are generally high, and the test-retest reliabilities are
moderate. Convergent, discriminant, and predictive valid-
ity of the scales are good [27].
Decision Making Tasks
Participants played two decision-making tasks. The first
one was the Ultimatum Game. All participants were run
simultaneously in one session, and first played the Ulti-
matum Game as Proposer. They were instructed to distrib-
ute $5 between themselves and their randomly assigned,
anonymous, partner. They were told that their partner
could either accept or reject their offer. If the offer was
accepted, the money would be divided as proposed. If the
offer was rejected, neither player would receive anything.
It was emphasized that this game was played for real
money and that participants would be paid directly based
on the decisions made in the games. The Proposer was
given a slip of paper with two rows indicating amounts
displayed in fifty-cent increments from $0 to $5, and
asked to circle the amount they wished to keep for them-
selves and the corresponding amount they wished to offer
to their partner. After the Proposer had indicated their
offer, the slip of paper was returned to the experimenters.
The experimenters then gave the slip to a randomly cho-
sen Responder, with the restriction that nobody received
their own offer. Following this, participants were
informed that they would now play the game as Respond-
ers and that they had the opportunity to accept or reject
the anonymous offer made to them.
In order to make sure that task administration with this
large group of participants was done in an efficient man-
ner, all participants were given a laminated card with a
code (a random number between 1 and 70). Prior to the
experiment, the experimenters had randomly paired code
numbers, with the restriction that a code number could
not be paired with itself. On beginning the experiment,
participants were given a slip of paper on which to write
their offers. These slips also contained the code of both
the Proposer (that participant) and the Responder (whose
identity was unknown to the Proposer). After the offers
were made, the slips were collected and redistributed to
the pre-assigned Responder.
Next, participants then played the Dictator Game. The
procedure was the same as outlined above, except that in
this game the Responder did not have the option to reject
the offer, and had to accept whatever the Proposer offered.
Proposers made dictator offers to a different, again anon-
ymous, partner than in the Ultimatum Game.
After task completion, the experimenters calculated partic-
ipants' payoffs for the tasks, and all participants com-
pleted the BIS/BAS Rating Scale. When participants had
completed the rating scales, they handed these in to one
of the three experimenters, who then informed them if the
offer they made in the Ultimatum Game was accepted or
rejected, and how much was given to them by their part-
ner in the Dictator Game. They were then paid accord-
ingly.
The following dependent variables were used for statisti-
cal analyses: Ultimatum Game proposals, Dictator Game
proposals, and difference scores (Ultimatum Game pro-
posal minus Dictator Game proposals). Using the two
games in combination, as reflected by the difference score,
helped us to asses the extent to which a "fairness compo-
nent" and a "strategic component" contributed to the
offers that were made. In the Ultimatum Game, people
may offer more than a minimal amount because they care
about equity (fairness component), or because they antic-
ipate that Responders will reject too low an offer (strategic
component). The larger the discrepancy between Ultima-
tum Game proposal and Dictator Game proposal, the
larger the strategic component in making offers. The
smaller the discrepancy between Ultimatum Game pro-
posal and Dictator Game proposal, the smaller the strate-
gic component in making offers (see also Statistical
Analyses).
Statistical Analyses
In order to test the hypothesis that individual differences
in the BAS are associated with decision making in eco-
nomic games, we computed bivariate correlations
between the BAS scales and offers in the Ultimatum Game
and Dictator Game. Because Ultimatum Game offers cor-
related with Dictator Game offers (r = .28, p < .05), we also
computed partial correlations between BAS scale scores
and Ultimatum Game offers (controlling for Dictator
Game offers), and between BAS scale scores and Dictator
Game offers (controlling for Ultimatum Game offers).
Partial correlations clarified whether Dictator Game offers
and Ultimatum Game offers were uniquely correlated
with BAS scales, over and beyond due to shared variance
between the two games. Finally, in order to understand to
what extent correlations between BAS scales and offers in
both games were associated with strategic or fairness-
related considerations, we computed correlations
between BAS scales and difference scores (Ultimatum
Game offers minus Dictator Game offers).
Outliers
Data for two participants were excluded from the analyses
because they showed a highly unusual pattern of respond-
ing [5], offering more than half to their partners in bothBehavioral and Brain Functions 2006, 2:35 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/2/1/35
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games ($3.50 and $4.50 respectively). Analyses including
these outliers did not change the results.
Results
Descriptives
In our participants, mean total scale scores for the BAS
scales were very similar to those reported in the original
sample [23]: BAS Reward Responsiveness 17.4 (SD 2.0),
BAS Drive 11.1 (SD 2.3), BAS Fun Seeking 12.6 (SD 2.1).
No differences between males and females were observed
for any of the BAS scales (all p's > .65).
The mean Ultimatum Game proposal was $2.37 (47% of
$5) (SD = .43), with $2.50 being the mode, very similar to
that generally observed in these studies [5]. The mean Dic-
tator Game proposal was $1.21 (24%) (SD = 1.1), with a
mode of $0. Seven percent of all Ultimatum Game offers
were quite low ($1.50 or less). Of those five Ultimatum
Game offers, two were rejected (40%). Ninety-three per-
cent of all Ultimatum Game offers were $2 or more. Of
those 62 offers, one was rejected (1.6%). The mean of the
rejected offers was $1.33 (SD 1.0), as compared to a mean
of $2.45 (SD .49) for accepted offers. No gender differ-
ences were found for Ultimatum Game proposals
(F(1,66) = .80, ns) or Dictator Game proposals (F(1,66) =
.22, ns).
Because the Dictator Game was always played after the
Ultimatum Game, one might expect that received Ultima-
tum Game offers may affect proposals made in the Dicta-
tor Game. In order to test for this potential order effect we
computed correlations between received Ultimatum
Game proposals and offers made in the Dictator Game.
There was no significant correlation (r = -.05, ns).
Correlational analyses: Ultimatum Game
When computing bivariate correlations, offers made in
the Ultimatum Game did not correlate significantly with
any of the BAS scales (Table 1). However, after controlling
for proposals made in the Dictator Game, Ultimatum
Game proposals did correlate positively with the BAS
Drive scale, but not significantly with the BAS Reward
Responsiveness and Fun Seeking scales (Table 1).
Correlational analyses: Dictator Game
Offers made in the Dictator Game correlated negatively
and significantly with BAS Reward Responsiveness and
BAS Drive, but not with BAS Fun Seeking. When control-
ling for Ultimatum Game proposals, Dictator Game pro-
posals still correlated negatively with the BAS Drive scale,
and even more strongly with the BAS Reward Responsive-
ness scale. No correlation with Fun Seeking was found
(Table 1).
Correlational analyses: Difference Scores
Difference scores (Ultimatum Game proposals minus
Dictator Game proposals) correlated negatively and sig-
nificantly with the BAS Reward Responsiveness scale and
the BAS Drive scale (Figure 1). No correlation between dif-
ference scores and BAS Fun Seeking was found (Table 1).
Discussion
This study investigated whether individual differences in
the BAS, namely Reward Responsiveness, Drive, and Fun
Seeking, were associated with offers made in two decision-
making tasks: the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator
Game. We found that higher scores on the BAS Drive scale
were associated with a pattern of higher offers on the Ulti-
matum Game (after controlling for Dictator Game offers),
lower offers on the Dictator Game, and a correspondingly
larger discrepancy between Ultimatum Game and Dicta-
tor Game offers. Higher scores on the BAS Reward
Responsiveness scale were also associated with lower
offers on the Dictator Game, and a larger discrepancy
between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers,
although the correlation with Ultimatum Game offers fell
short of significance. The BAS Fun Seeking scale did not
correlate with offers made in these decision making tasks.
These findings demonstrate that individual differences in
basic psychological processes, such as reward sensitivity,
can help understand performance on economic and social
decision-making tasks, processes which hitherto have not
been used to explain behavior in these contexts. Our
results provide evidence for the hypothesis that individual
differences in certain personality features, in this case
Drive and Reward Responsiveness, contribute to individ-
ual differences in decision making, in this case offers
made in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. We had
Table 1: Bivariate and partial correlations between proposals made and the Behavioral Activation System scales
UG proposal UG proposal controlled 
for DG proposal
DG proposal DG proposal controlled 
for UG proposal
UG-DG proposal BAS
RR
BAS
Dr
BAS FS
BAS RR .08 .21 -.34** -.37** .38*** 1 - -
BAS Dr .18 .27* -.27* -.34** .36** .55*** 1 -
BAS FS -.01 .03 -.15 -.14 .15 .51*** .45*** 1
UG, Ultimatum Game; DG, Dictator Game; BAS, Behavioral Activation System; RR, Reward Responsiveness; Dr, Drive; FS, Fun Seeking.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001Behavioral and Brain Functions 2006, 2:35 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/2/1/35
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hypothesized that higher BAS scores would be associated
with lower offers on both the Ultimatum Game and the
Dictator Game, on the assumption that individuals with
higher reward sensitivity would attempt to maximize their
monetary earnings on each trial. As expected, higher
scores on BAS Drive and Reward Responsiveness were
associated with lower offers on the Dictator Game. How-
ever, contrary to our predictions, higher BAS Drive and
Reward Responsiveness scores were associated with higher
offers on the Ultimatum Game. Moreover, higher BAS
scores were associated with larger drops from Ultimatum
Game to Dictator Game offers.
This pattern of correlations is best interpreted, we believe,
by proposing that individuals with high scores on Reward
Responsiveness and Drive scales use particular strategies
in decision-making. Specifically, this strategy first seeks to
maximize the likelihood of reward, and then seeks to max-
imize the amount  of reward. In the Ultimatum Game,
when offers can be rejected by their partner – thus leaving
both players with nothing – people with higher scores on
Drive and Reward Responsiveness make higher offers.
While in isolation it may appear that higher Ultimatum
Game offers may reflect increased concern for equity and
fairness, the pattern of results suggests that instead it
seems designed to ensure that the offer will not be
rejected, thus resulting in a higher probability of getting
something instead of nothing. In the Dictator Game,
when the partner cannot reject the offer, people with
higher Reward Responsiveness and Drive now make lower
offers, thus maximizing their own gains. The difference
score between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers
directly reflects the strategic component (as opposed to
the fairness component) of the offers made. Thus, higher
scores on Reward Responsiveness and Drive are associated
with lower offers to the partner, but only when there is the
certainty of this offer being accepted. When the offer can
be rejected Reward Responsiveness and Drive are associ-
ated with higher offers, potentially as a strategy to ensure
to obtain something, rather than running the risk of
obtaining nothing.
These results indicate that there are additional factors
other than empathy, fairness and selfishness that deter-
mine whether a person offers a larger or smaller piece of
the pie to their partner [[34]; see also 25]. Specifically,
these results offer insight into individual differences that
contribute to strategic decision making in Ultimatum
Game and Dictator Game: Drive and Reward Responsive-
ness are associated with the strategic component of deci-
sion making, as reflected in the differences between
Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers.
Use of both Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game games
in the current study allowed us to determine more pre-
cisely the motivations behind the offers in these tasks. As
discussed previously, Dictator Game offers are a relatively
"pure" measure of altruism, while Ultimatum Game offers
typically mix equity and strategy. In a previous study [25],
the relationship between Ultimatum Game offers and per-
sonality measures (in this case extraversion) was investi-
gated. A positive correlation between Ultimatum Game
offers and individual differences in extraversion was
found, and interpreted as indicating increased equity con-
siderations on the part of proposers with higher extraver-
sion scores. However, if that study had also included the
Dictator Game, the authors may have reached a different
conclusion. In our dataset, we similarly find a positive cor-
relation between Ultimatum Game offers and the person-
ality measure used here (BAS Reward Responsiveness).
However, the negative correlation found between this
individual difference measure and Dictator Game offers
allows us to draw a fuller conclusion about the nature of
decisions in these games, namely that both of these corre-
lations can be explained by increased desire for certainty
of reward in individuals with greater Reward Responsive-
ness. Therefore, by using different games in concert we can
make, we believe, more detailed conclusions about the
motivations behind the decisions.
The lack of correlation between offers and BAS Fun Seek-
ing is in line with our expectations. Given that the Fun
Seeking scale measures sensation seeking and acting on
the spur of a moment (e.g., "I crave excitement and new
sensations", "I often act on the spur of a moment") more
than reward sensitivity, we did not expect this scale to cor-
relate with offers in economic games. Thus, only specific
aspects of BAS, in this case Reward Responsiveness and
Drive, correlated with decision making in economic
games.
Given the substantial correlations between the 3 BAS
scales (Table 1), one question is whether BAS Reward
Responsiveness and Drive uniquely contribute to Ultima-
tum Game and Dictator Game offers. To address this
question, we computed partial correlations between the
BAS Drive scale and the Ultimatum Game-Dictator Game
difference score, and between the BAS Reward Respon-
siveness scale and the Ultimatum Game-Dictator Game
difference score, while controlling for the other 2 BAS
scales. This analysis showed that only the correlation
between Reward Responsiveness and the Ultimatum
Game-Dictator Game difference score remained signifi-
cant (r = .26, p < .05), while the correlation between Drive
and Ultimatum Game-Dictator Game difference score fell
short of significance (r = .21, p < .10). This suggests that
the use of a reward-maximizing strategy in the Ultimatum
Game and Dictator Game is more strongly associated with
Reward Responsiveness than with Drive.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2006, 2:35 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/2/1/35
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This study focused on the role of personality features, in
particular various aspects of BAS, in relation to offers
made in the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game. Future
research will also need to examine the potential role of
these personality features in the Responders' reactions of
accepting or rejecting Ultimatum Game proposals made
to them. The current dataset did not allow for such an
analysis, because, as is usually observed, most offers in the
Ultimatum Game were fair and therefore accepted by the
responders.
Additionally, future research would benefit from using
brain imaging techniques to increase our understanding
of the neural basis of individual differences in the reward
system and how these contribute to decision making in
economic games. One fMRI study has investigated the
neural basis of rejections versus acceptances in the Ulti-
matum Game [35]. However, no research to date has
focused on the neural basis of proposals made. Individual
differences in self-reported Reward Responsiveness and
Drive are likely associated with individual differences in
brain activation in areas previously shown to be impor-
tant in reward processing, such as ventral striatum and
orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal areas [36]. In a recent
brain imaging study, individual differences in extraver-
sion appeared to account for a substantial proportion of
variance in reward-related activation in bilateral medial
orbitofrontal cortex and right nucleus accumbens [37].
Future brain imaging research can shed light on how indi-
vidual differences in the brain reward system contribute to
strategic decision making in the Ultimatum and Dictator
Games.
Conclusion
This experiment showed that individual differences in
Reward Responsiveness and Drive were linked to strategic
decision-making in both the Ultimatum and Dictator
Games, two commonly-used economic decision tasks.
More broadly, these results demonstrate that investigating
the role of psychological processes in these type of tasks
can help gain a better understanding of the motives that
underlie decision-making.
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